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MARJORIE OWEN,
With the Treaty of Versailles not yet ten years old, we may
hesitate at the implications of the axiom that consent is the
essential element in treaties. But whatever the compulsion
which drives states into the conference hall, it seems that, once
there, they must be judged by their own terminology as the
"High Contracting Parties." Yet mutual consent, in the legal
sense, is no simple irreducible element, clearly present or not
present in any given draft; it is rather a shifting elusive com-
pound which the signatories must seek to crystallize in the
written form, and which diplomats and arbitrators may later
resolve in very different shape, from words which have changed
not their letters but their connotation.' Thus the business of
treaty-drafting and interpretation becomes a business of endless
approximation: the clothing of the intangible in the tangible,
of the inarticulate in speech.
It is believed that the practice of introducing reservations
into treaties had its beginning as part of this business of
approximation. 2 Faced with the difficulty of compromising and
* This article reproduces matter considered in the Seminar in Public
International Law at Columbia Law School.
IIt is for this reason that it is of the highest importance to maintain the
rule of international law that the cardinal principle of treaty interpretation
is to ascertain the meaning which the contracting parties intended to con-
vey. To this end any pertinent data should be utilized and there should be
no confinement within the narrow limits of artificial "rules of construction."
The science of international law should not make more difficult the problem
of expressing the agreed meaning by rendering unavailable for later use
the explanations which have been made contemporaneously. "It must how-
ever be borne in mind that the final purpose of seeking the intention of the
contracting States is to ascertain the sense in which terms are used. .... "
2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1922) §§ 530, 531. And the same writer
further: "As the sense which contracting states have attached to the terms
of their agreement is controlling in the estimation of those to whom are
entrusted the duty of interpreting treaties, as all circumstances probative
of that fact are admissible for the purpose of its establishment, the forma-
tion of rules of interpretation can hardly serve a useful purpose. .... "
Hyde, Concerning the Interpretation of Treaties (1909) 3 Am. J. INT. LAW
46. See also TsuNE-CHi Yii, THE INTERP-TATION oF TREATiES (1927)
52-58; Wright, The Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties (1929) 23
AM. J. INT. LAw 94; Malkin, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions
(1926). EnITIsH YAR-BooK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 141-162.
2 Report presented by Senor Gutierrez to the Havana Conference 1928.
"La antiqua doctrina establece que los Tratados debidn ser ratificados en
conjunto o rechazados totalmente, pero en la prdctica se ha visto quo muchas
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reconciling different points of view, negotiators have sought to
enter any verbal port to escape the storm of conflicting thoughts
and interests. Where agreement on the general principle had
been secured, it was felt that particular deviations might well
be tolerated lest the substance be lost. The argument was attrac-
tive but dangerous. It has introduced in place of the principle
of unanimous consent to a single text what Hoijer calls ",2u
a1ment de trouble et d'incertitude." 3
In the first place, so far from any safeguard existing that the
reservations will be confined to the "constitutional or traditional
technicalities" envisaged by Sefior Gutierrez,4 there is an ever
present danger that they may so far impinge upon the general
proposals underlying the treaty as to rob that document of all
reality. This seems actually to have been the case with the
London Sugar Convention of 18S2,5 which Austria-Hungary,
Brazil, Belgium, France, and Sweden each signed under the
proviso that the obligations were to mature contingently upon
unreserved ratification by all the other powers. It followed that
the treaty never came into effect, and a new treaty on the same
lines was not concluded until 1902.0 This was the earliest case,
at least of modern times, where reservations were introduced
into a multilateral convention, and it constitutes an omen of the
future development of the policy and a monument to what has
been called "la -manie de faire des trf.tits." 7 This first unhappy
example suggests that the practice of admitting reservations
has done nothing to discourage man's natural passion for treaty-
making, since signatories may claim the moral advantage of a
treaty while obviating all burdensome obligations by a timely
reservation. But where nobody is prepared to make concessions,
veces tecnicismos constitucionales o principios tradicionales impedian
aceptar determinadas estipulaciones que no eran de trascendencia para el
pacto, y la costumbre estableci6 el uso de reservas en la ratificaci6n, sobre
cuestiones especfficas y concretas .... 1" 20 DLIo 235.
3 HoIjER, LES TATns INTE1uATIONAUX (1928) 46.
4 Supra note 2.
:; 18 DE CLERCQ, RECUEIL DES TRA1TEs DE LA F&IMCE 90-99: "The point in
respect to this Convention was that the Convention must either include all
the contracting states or would not be worth signing. The proviso was
therefore an essential part of the treaty, and was included in the form of
a reservation for drafting purposes. It therefore differs from such reserva-
tions as those to the Multilateral Convention for the Renunciation of War,
since it was understood by the parties that the Treaty should not go into
effect unless all the other Powers signed."
Notice the Opium Convention of 1912, which in art. 24 provides that the
convention shall only come into effect after it has been approved by all the
powers and the various decisions of supplementary conventions resolving
to put the treaty into effect, even if all the powers do not sign it.
622 DE CLERCQ, op. cit. spra note 5, at 82.
7 DE BIRIMONDE, LES TRArrEs IiP4aFrts (1920) 151.
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it is idle to talk of agreement. It is not the least of the disad-
vantages of reservations that they serve to hide this unfortunate
fact.
The second difficulty which follows from the practice of intro-
ducing reservations is that signatories may be under a real
uncertainty as to the extent of their obligations as a result of
reservations made by other parties. This matter has been
receiving attention of late from various international confer-
ences, 8 and from the consensus of juristic opinion it seems pos-
sible to collect some guiding principles.
It may, perhaps, be contended that the question is referable
to the prime fact of consent. This proposition seems to be
supported by the present trend of opinion. It seems that the
reservation stands on the same footing as the treaty to which it
is appended, and, like the treaty, it must stand or fall as consent
is or is not present. It is further believed that the customary
practice as to the forms such reservations should take is, in
reality, simply a safeguard that this necessary element be not
overlooked.
Today the matter merits immediate attention from the "reser-
vations" 9 which certain powers, particularly France,10 Czecho-
s Projects on the question of reservations to multilateral conventions were
adopted by the American Institute of International Law in 1924 and in 1925,
and were submitted to the governing board of the Pan-American union in
the latter year. A project was submitted to the Havana Conference of 1928
by the International Commission of Jurists, and was substantially adopted
by the conference.
In addition, the Council of the League of Nations, at the instance of the
British government, submitted the question to a specially constituted Com-
mittee of Experts in March 1926. The report containing the recommenda-
tions of this committee was submitted to the Council of the League in June
1927, and was then adopted. This report is quoted infra, p. 1111.
9 The popular use of this term to cover the various declarations etc. made
by the signatories to the pact exceeds its strict significance as a term of
art. Some attempt is made inf'ra at page 1102 to delimit more exactly the
nature of a reservation, as distinguished from other qualifying provisions,
but it is the view of the writer that little light is thrown on the question
under discussion by differences of nomenclature. "Whether the announced
conditions upon which Great Britain and France were willing to sign this
Pact are called 'interpretations,' 'reservations,' 'qualifications,' or what not,
they express as clearly as language can express a purpose, intention, and
understanding, that these countries have signed the treaty on the sole condi-
tion that their obligations under the treaty are to be interpreted and under-
stood in the light of the declarations thus officially made and communicated."
Borchard, The Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War (1929) 23
Am. J. Int. Law 116.
10 M. Briand's note to Ambassador Herrick of July 14, 1928 reserves to
France the right to make war in case of self-defence, obligations under the
Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Treaty, or "treaties of
neutrality" and the release of obligations towards a treaty-breakling state.




Slovakia,"' and Great Britain 2 have expressed in correspondence
upon signing the Mlultilateral Pact for the Renunciation of
War.13 Russia, upon the occasion of her adhesion, 4 expressly
declared that she considered these "reservations" to have no
binding effect upon one not a party to the correspondence. Tur-
key, when notifying the United States of her intention to adhere,
said that she considered herself ". . bound by the text of the
proposed act exclusive of all the documents which have not been
submitted as an integral part of the pact itself to the collective
signatures of the participating states." 15 Persia 1I and Egypt ',
proposed to adhere under "reservations" criticizing impliedly
the substantial policy of the British "reservation."
Two questions seem to arise. One raises broadly the effect of
collateral documents upon the construction of a treaty.18 The
-iM. Ben~s in his note to Minister Einstein, on July 20, 1928, made reser-
vations in the cases contemplated by France, and, in addition "the obliga-
tions contained in existing treaties which the Czecho-Slovak Republic has
hitherto made." Ibid. 51.
12 Sir Austen Chamberlain in his note to Ambassador Houghton, May 19,
1928, repeats the French reservations, with the exception of the "neutrality
treaties," and continues: "There are certain regions of the world the wel-
fare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our
peace and safety. His Majesty's Government have been at pains to make
it clear in the past that interference in these regions cannot b suffered.
Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-
defence. It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government, in
Great Britain, accept the treaty upon the distinct understanding that it
does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect. The Government
of the United States have comparable interests, any disregard of which by
a foreign power they have declared they would consider as an unfriendly
act. His Majesty's Government believe therefore, that in defining their
position they are e.9ressing the intention and meaning of the United States'
Government" Ibid. 26.
13Ibid. 1; the text of the pact and of the correspondence is also given in
Shotwell, The Paris Pact (1928) INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION PAMPHLETS,
No. 243. See also, SHOTWELL, WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POL-
ICY AND ITS RENUNCIATION IN THE PACT OF PARIS (1928); MIILWR, TiE
P ACE PACT oF PARIS (1928).
141n a note to the French ambassador at Moscow, dated August 31, 1928.
The text is quoted infra at 1105-1106; and may be found in Shotvell, The
Paris Pact, supra note 13, at 91.
15 This is stated not to exclude the American explanatory note of June
23, 1928. Ibid. 496. The Turkish note is dated October 31, 1928.
26 By a note dated October 4, 1928.
17 By a note dated September 4, 1928. The adhesion of Egypt is not to
be construed as 'qmplying any admission of any reserve whatever made
in connection with the pact." This passage is given in the issue of the
Egyptian Gazette dated September 5, 1928.
An abstract of the Turkish, Persian and Egyptian notes may be found
in The Anti-War Pact (1928) 4 FOREIGN POLICY ASSoCIATION INFORmATIO
SERvICE, No. 18.
18 This aspect of the problem has received admirable treatment from
Professor Quincy Wright, op. cit. supra. note 1.
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other deals more narrowly with the form in which reservations
should be made and with the resulting obligations of other sig-
natories. It is this second question which will receive present
attention.
BILATERAL TREATIES
The practice of the last fifty years seems to have established
the principle that a reservation may be introduced at any point
in the making of a treaty. But where there are only two parties
to any given treaty, it follows that the reservation must be
formulated at the moment either of signature or of ratification.
The first case really presents no difficulty. The reservation,
however unilateral it may be in form, must necessarily have
received the assent of the other signatory and is submitted as
an integral part of the treaty at the exchange of ratifications.
It is with the case of reservations made by one party upon
ratification that the first hint of difficulty appears. This diffi-
culty consists in ensuring that the consent present at signature
is extended to embrace all modifications present upon ratifica-
tion. It seems reasonably clear that in the case of the United
States and of other countries having a similar constitutional
process,19 reservations often make their appearance not so much
because the signatory parties themselves claim a locus peniten-
tide, but rather because the act of ratification calls into play
other points of view, such as that of the Senate of the United
States, which found no direct expression in the negotiation and
signature. 0
An early example of a reservation made upon ratification
occurs in the Treaty of Peace and Amity negotiated between
France and the United States in 1800.21 The Senate on February
3, 1801 advised and consented to the treaty-
"Provided that the second article be expunged, and that
the following article be added or inserted :-'It is agreed
that the present convention shall be in force for the term
19 France, whose constitution requires the interposition of the Chambres
for certain treaties only, has her special problems. These are considered in
MIcHON, LES TRAiTtS INTERNATIONAUX DEVANT LES CHAMIBRES (1901);
CLUNET, DU DEFAUT DE VALIDITE DE PLUSIEURS TRAITL'S DIPLOIATIQUES
(1880) 20 et seq.
20 Report of Senor Orestes-Ferrara, Rapporteur from the Committee on
Treaties to the Havana Conference 1928: "... En ]a ratificaci6n con-
curren Poderes que iio intervinieron en la concertaci6n. Por lo tanto, antes
de ser ratificado, el Estado puede no aceptar el Tratado concertado o Intro-
ducir reservas. Ambas cosas constituyen un derecho legitimo quo no
infringe ningfin principio de derecho internacional. . . ." 18 DIARIo 232.




of eight years from the exchange of the present ratifica-
tions'." 22
The reservation of the Senate was accepted by the First Consul,
Napoleon Bonaparte-
"With the addition importing that the convention shall be
in force for the space of eight years and with the retrench-
ment of the second article,-Provided that by this retrench-
ment the two States renounce the respective pretensions
which are the object of the said articles."
Ratifications were exchanged at Paris on June 31st of the same
year; the treaty was thereafter submitted to the Senate of the
United States, which on December 10, 1801 declared the treaty
to be fully ratified and returned it to the President for promul-
gation.
The course of these negotiations has been described at some
length, because it is significant that the parties seem to have
treated the reservation of the Senate as a counter-offer, 2 requir-
ing French acceptance to complete it. And although the treaty
had been formally ratified in February 1801, it appeared before
the Senate again in December of the same year, with the addition
of the French declaration, and this time the activity of the Sen-
ate was confined to a "declaration" that ratification was com-
plete. By these means it was ensured that mutual consent might
extend to every provision in the final agreement.21 This early
precedent has not gone unsupported. Estimates of the number
of bilateral treaties since 1800 to which the Senate has intro-
duced reservations vary from sixty-six to eighty-seven.2
22 -Aticle II ran: "The ministers plenipotentiary of the two parties not
being able to agree at present respecting the Treaty of Alliance of the
sixth of February 1778, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of the same
date, and the Convention of the fourteenth November 1788, nor upon the
indemnities mutually due or claimed, the parties will negotiate further on
these subjects at a convenient time, and until they have agreed upon theze
points the said treaties and convention shall have no operation, and the
relations of the two countries shall be regulated as follows .....
23 This is the theory of reservations adopted in 2 HYDE, op. cit. CZ!pna note
1, at § 519.
24 When the extreme anxiety of the young republic to obtain diplomatie
countenance from Europe by means of these treaties is borne in mind, the
interposition of the Senate obtains an added significance, showing a deter-
mination that no political considerations should be allowed to hamper that
part in treaty-making assured to that body by the Constitution. The func-
tion of the Senate is considered in BUTLER, THE T=ATY-MARIKNG PoWr o'
THE UNITED STATES (1902) ; also, CRANmD.LL, T TEATmS, THEM MRING AND
ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 1916).
25 The former figure given by Washburn, Treaty Amcndvznts and Recer-
vations (1920) 5 CoRN. L. Q. 247. MILER, RESERVATIONS TO TREATIEs
(1919) considers a selective group of treaties only. It may be said that
there is a very general disagreement among the authorities. Eighty-seven
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It has been the custom of the Senate of late years, when
inserting reservations into bilateral treaties, to ensure that the
other signatory shall be committed by express consent to the
proposed reservations. This is no longer done by continued
exchange and re-exchange of the entire treaty, as in the Franco-
American Treaty of 1800 referred to above; instead, the Senate
commonly requires that there shall be an exchange of notes to
ascertain whether the proposed reservations will be acceptable
to the other signatory. One might cite as an example the North
Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration Convention of 1909 between Great
Britain and the United States, 26 where the Senate advised ratifi-
cation, "subject to its understanding" that question five of the
compromis was not to extend to the Bay of Fundy, nor to preju-
dice either party's rights therein. This "understanding" was
communicated to the British ambassador by Secretary of State
Bacon, who expressed the hope that the former would
". in like manner formally confirm the assent of His
Majesty's Government to this understanding . . . and that
you will be prepared at an early date to exchange the notes
confirming the Special Agreement as provided for therein."
Again, the Senate's ratification of the treaty of 1916 27 with
Denmark by which the Danish West Indies were purchased by
the Ulaited States appeared in the following form:
".. . The Senate . . . advises and consents on condition
that the attitude of the United States in this matter, as set
forth in the above proviso, be made the subject of an
exchange of notes between the Governments of the two High
Contracting Parties, and so as to make it plain that this
condition is understood and accepted by the two Govern-
ments. .. "
The ratification of the Military Service Convention between
the United States and Great Britain of 1918 28 provided that the
interpretation of Article 1 should be fixed by an exchange of
notes.
It may be mentioned that this practice on the part of the
United States has occasionally been used to introduce modifica-
bilateral treaties to which reservations were attached by the American
Senate, and which were thereafter ratified, are noted in the appendix to
(1928) 4 FoREIGN PoLicY ASSOCIATION INFORMATION SERvicE, No. 16. This
appendix is stated to be based upon lists prepared by Dr. W. Stull Holt,
from the "Executive Journals" (up to 1901 only); by Dr. C. C. Tansill,
in (1924). 18 Am. J. INT. LAW; by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge in Scribner's
Magazine for January 1902. The compilers of the appendix deprecate any
claim that their list is complete, as some treaties entered into since 1901
are subject to an injunction of secrecy.
26 1 MALLOY, op. cit. supra note 21, at 835.




tions desired by the other party after its ratification has been
completed. This happened in the case of a treaty between the
United States and New Granada in 1857,2 in which the Senate
introduced amendments "Agreeably to the modifications ap-
proved by the Granadan Confederacy.. ."
The latest example of language worthy of note is Secretary
Kellogg's note to Ambassador Von Maltzan, communicating the
Senate's reservation to the Treaty of Commerce between the
United States and Germany " of Mlarch 19, 1925:
".... I shall be glad if when bringing the foregoing to
the attention of your government, you will inform it that it
is the hope of this government that your government will
find acceptable the reservations and understandings which
the Senate has made a condition of its advice and consent
to the ratification of the treaty. You may regard this note
as sufficient acceptance by the United States of these reser-
vations and understandings. An acknowledgment of this
note on the occasion of the exchange of ratifications accept-
ing, by direction and on behalf of your government, the
said reservations and understandings will be considered as
completing the required exchange of notes and acceptance
by both governments of the reservations and understand-
ings .... 1,,31
In accordance with the American suggestion, Ambassador Von
Alaltzan on May 21, 1925 signified by note the decision of the
German government to accept the reservations introduced by
the Senate resolution, "notwithstanding serious fundamental
objections." -32 It is probable that the practice outlined above
secures mutual consent to the final draft with the minimum of
formality.
33
From these examples it seems reasonably clear that neither
party has doubted the right of the other to introduce reserva-
29 Ibid. 210.
3O U. S. TREATY SERIEs (1925) No. 725.
31 Ibid. 32.
32 Ibid. 33.
33 An attempt to extend the practice to multilateral treaties has not how-
ever met with success. By his note of Mlarch 2, 1926 to the Secretariat of
'the League of Nations, Secretary Kellogg communicated the Senate's rezo-
lution of adherence to the World Court protocol under rcscrvations, and
requested that the acceptance of the reservations by the signatories of the
protocol might be made by an exchange of notes. (1926) 7 LEAGUE OF
NATIONS OFFiciAL JOURNAL 628-629. Sir Austen Chamberlain, speaking at
the 39th Session of the Council of the League of Nations on March 17, 1926,
said: "It is not usual that rights established by an instrument which has
been ratified should be varied by a mere exchange of notes."
The United States remained firm. In his reply, dated April 9, 1926, to
the invitation to the United States to attend the Geneva session of the
Council of the League to consider the Senate's resolution, Secretary Kellogg
said: "These reservations are plain and unequivocal and, according to their
1093
YALE LAW JOURNAL
tions at the time of ratification: the only restriction upon this
liberty is that the other signatory shall consent to such reserva-
tions.
MULTILATERAL TREATIES
It may be well in passing to inquire what is the nature of the
relation created by a multilateral treaty, for upon this question
depends the effect of the reservations upon the obligations of
other signatories. Can we say that there is but one many-sided
obligation created as a result of the agreements? 34 In this case,
a qualification in the consent of any signatory, whether made by
reservations or other means, if acquiesced in by the other sig-
natories, would modify tie relations inter se of all parties to
the treaty; on the other hand, if this consent were absent, there
would be no meeting of the minds, and therefore no obligation
under the proposed treaty at all.
General practice seems to show that neither the premise nor
the conclusion can be adopted. It is accepted that the introduc-
tion of a reservation by state A upon ratification of a treaty
cannot by any means affect the relations existing between states
B and C, who are prior signatories. 35 The operation of A's
reservation will affect only the relations of B and C with itself.
terms, they must be accepted by the exchange of notes between the United
States and each one of the forty-eight States signatory to the Statute of
the Permanent Court of International Justice before the United States can
become a party and sign the Protocol The resolution specifically provided
this mode of procedure." Text in (1926) 20 AMx. J. INT. LAW 554. Owing
to the rejection by the signatories to the protocol of the Senate's reserva-
tions, the matter was dropped.
34 The analogy of private law is not of great assistance, as it is difficult
to collect a general principle from the rules framed to meet particular cir-
cumstances. Those who incline to the "single obligation" theory may find
some support in the Roman concept of correalty. SoHm, INSTTUTSS (1901)
§ 74: "A correal obligation is a plurality of obligations, where there is,
economically speaking, only one obligation. And the correal obligation of
Roman Law is one not only economically, but also legally, in virtue of the
fact that legally speaking, the plurality of the obligations constitutes one
common obligation of the several parties concerned . . . Hence the
Romans described a correal obligation as una. obligatio (communis obli-
gatio) and the parties to a correal obligation as persons who unims loco
habentur (eiusdem obligationis participes, eiusdem obligationiv soaii)."
Buckland, however, takes the view that the significance of the concept is
adjective onlf and that this metaphysical "communis obligatio" implies only
peculiar methods of discharge. BUCxLAND, TnxT-Boo OF ROMAN LAW
(1921) 450.
35 This relation is an existing fact at the moment of the formulation of
the reservation by the later state. An alteration in such relation with the
consent of B and C constitutes in reality a case of the novation of an earlier
agreement by the adoption of a new one.
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This proposition is supported by Article VI of the Convention
on Treaties adopted by the Havana Conference of 1928::1
S.-. In international treaties celebrated between different
states, a reservation made by one of them in the act of
ratification affects only the application of the clause in ques-
tion in relations of the other contracting parties with the
state making the reservation ......
The delegates of the United States commented upon this
clause: -
"This is an express acceptance of the theory and practice of
the United States. ...."
On the whole it seems that there are less difficulties inherent
in the theory which sees in the multilateral treaty an aggregate
of bilateral obligations, although it must be recognised that the
phraseology or purpose of a particular multilateral treaty may
compel a different conclusion. Such a theory provides a better
rationale for the axiom that the relations of state A with states
B and C under the reservation depend upon the consent of states
B and C, who may refuse to accede to the reservation in question
and thus preclude state A from all participation in the treaty 5
But as soon as the necessity for the consent of other signa-
tories is openly accepted, the problem of reservations shifts,
36 The English text seems unfortunately ambiguous. The Spanish text
is as follows: "En los tratados internacionales celebrados entre diverzos
estados, la reserva hecha por unos de ellos en el acto de la ratificacifn, solo
afecta a ]a applicacion de la clausula respectiva en las relaciones de lo3
demas estados contratantes con el estado que hace la reserva... ." Com-
plete texts may be found in REPORT OF THE DELEGATES FROM THE UNTIED
STATES TO THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF A.mERICAN STATES
(Government Printing Office 1928); also in (1928) 22 A?.T. J. INT. LAW
(Supp.) 138-142.
Ibid.
3 8 Senator Lodge, in a conference held by President Wilson with the Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations, said: "Mr. President . .. I take
it there is no question whatever under International Law and practice, that
an amendment to the text of a treaty must be submitted to every signatory
and must receive either their assent or dissent. . . " The Senator then
went on to suggest a difference between such an "amendment" and a reser-
vation. Full text may be found in SEN. Doc. No. 106, 66th Cong. 1st Sess.
at 509. Sir Austen Chamberlain, in the course of the debate in the Council
of the League of Nations on the report from the Committee of Experts to
whom the question of the admissibility of reservations to multilateral con-
ventions had been submitted, said: "They were all agreed ... that a
reservation must be accepted by the parties to the convention, and, unless
it were so accepted, an adherence accompanied by the reservation had not
the effect of an adherence... ." (1927) 7 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFI AL
JOURNAL 770. This proposition receivedgeneral endorsement in Article




becoming formal in nature, and envisaging only the means by
which the fact of consent is to be established. These means will
be found to vary according to the chronological moment in the
formulation of the treaty when the reservation is put forward.
Where the reservation is made upon signature, no special for-
mality seems to be necessary.
Between the London Sugar Convention of 1882 5 and the
Brussels Convention upon Maritime Collisions and Salvage of
1910,40 there were at least twenty-two multilateral treaties to
which reservations were attached upon signature.41 Since that
39 DE CLERCQ, loc. cit. supra note 5.
40 DE MARTENS, NouvEAu RECUEIL GENERAL DES TRAITES (3d Series) vol.
7, p. 711.
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supra note 39, at 90-99
14 ibid. 488
17 ibid. 264
2 MALLOY, op. cit. supra
note 21, at 1943
19 DE MARTENS (2d
series) op. cit. supra
note 40, at 260.
Ibid. 3
2 MALLoY, op. cit. suprd
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date, it has become more common to formulate reservations
upon ratification, and reservations upon signature have been
made, so far as the writer is aware, upon five occasions only:
(1920) Berne Convention for Protection of Industrial
Property.-
(1923) Protocol upon Arbitration Clauses.43
(1924) Convention for the Suppression of Obscene Pub-
lications.4'
(1926) Sanitary Convention5
(1929) Pan-American Arbitration Convention.'5
In all these cases, equally with the case of bilateral treaties,
a ratification automatically embraces the reservations made at
the time of signature; - so little difficulty is found in collecting
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42 12 DE MARTENS, op. cit. supra note 40, at 596.
43 27 LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SERIs (1924) 158.
44 Ibid. 215.
45 U. S. TREATY SERIES (U. S. 1928) No. 762.
40 The reservations may be found in (1929) 23 Am. 3. IN?. LAW (Supp.)
85-88.
- It seems that the reservation may be attached at signature in almost
any form. At the London Sugar Conference of 1882 (see supra note 5)
the Belgian representative asked to have the Belgian reservation formulated
in the protocol of signature. The chairman, M. le Baron de Worms, de-
clared this precaution to be unnecessary. "La mention des rmerve3 de la
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Great Britain's reservations to the Geneva Convention of
1906 48 were the occasion for the expression of a curious view in
the Deutsches Reichs Gesetzblatt of 1907, ° where it was argued
that the subsequent ratification of the Convention by Great
Britain nullified the reservations she had formulated upon signa-
ture. If this view were to be generally adopted, it would seem
to follow that all signatories would postpone all reservations
until the date of ratification, whence there would be more con-
fusion. The suggestion seems to lack support both in theory
and in practice. It has been severely criticized by M. de Miri-
monde.-
The earliest case in modern times of a reservation to a mul-
tilateral treaty made at the moment of ratification seems to be
that of the Anti-Slavery Agreement of Brussels of 1890,51 in
which France reserved the operation of certain clauses with the
consent of the other signatory powers.52 Since 1890 there have
been at least fifteen such treaties, of which nine were signed
after 1910.5 It will be seen that the practice is of recent growth.
Belgique dans le procs-verbal de ]a pr~c~dente s~ance a absolument ]a
m~me valeur qui si elle 6tait faite dans le protocol .... " DE CLERcQ, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 91. Procs-Verbal of the 26th Session of the Conference.
482 DE MARTENS, op. cit. supra note 40, at 323.
'9 Issue number 25; 2 DE MARTENS, op. cit. supra note 40, at 323.
5o DE MIRIMONDE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 42.
5 2 MALLOY, op. cit. supra note 21, at 1964; also 18 DE CLERCQ, X, op. it.
supra note 5, at 496-549.
Fl The protocol of the deposit of ratifications contains the following note:
"Les repr~sentants des Puissances donnent acte A M. le Ministre do France
du dep6t des ratifications du President de ]a Rpublique Frangaise, ainsi
que de l'exception portant sur les articles 21, 22 et 23 et sur les articles 42
A 61." Ibid,. 543.
43 The full list is as follows:
Date Title Ref
1890-Brussels A n t i- 2 MA
Slavery Agree- note
ment
1903 Sanitary C on - Ibid.
vention
1907 Convention II of Ibid.
2d Hague Peace
Conference
1906 Algeciras C o n- Ibid.
vention




1910 Copyright Con- -8 DE
vention supr(
.erence



















The difficulties to which it gives rise are of a practical nature,
flowing from the custom by which ratifications are frequently
not exchanged simultaneously at a special meeting of the pleni-
potentiaries, but are deposited with one of the signatories at
varying dates."
Before going further, it may be well to say that the problem
of ensuring the presence of consent seems to center round the
fact of chronology, as it is this question of the time when the
final consent is given which causes modern difficulties. For the
present purposes, then, it seems to matter very little whether
the reservation is formulated upon the ratification of a signatory







1912 Sanitary C o n -
vention













1926 Sanitary C o n-
vention
3 MALLOY, op. cit. supre
note 21, at 2953
Ibid. 3048
Ibid. 2972
35 LEAGUE OF NATIONS
TREATY SERIES 300
3 MALLOY, op. cit. supra
note 21, at 3093
Ibid. 3098
TREATY SERIES (U. S.)
No. 751
51 LEAGUE Os NATIONS
TREATY SERIES, 338











5 The older practice was followed in the "Four-Power Treaty" of Wash-
ington on Near-Pacific Relations, 1921. 3 MALLOY, op. cit. supra note 21,
at 3093. The following reservation made by the United States at the time
of the deposit of ratifications was recorded in the proces-verbal: "The
United States understands that under the statement in the preamble or
under the terms of this treaty there is no commitment to armed force, no
alliance, no obligation to join in any defence." This example is quoted to
show the ease with which under the older procedure consent might be im-
puted from the fact that all parties had the proposed reservation brought
to their attention,'at the time.
:An example of an accession under reservation which does not seem
to have provoked comment is *that of Iraq to the White Slave Traffic Con-
vention of 1910. See 35 LEAGUE Os NATIONS TREATY SERIEs (1925) S34.
Iraq reserved the right to fix a lower age-limit than that confemplated in
the treaty. The Secretary-General on May 6, 1927 called attention in a
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is that it should appear at some point after one party has put
the final symbol of his approval upon the treaty.
The question is presented something like this: suppose state
K ratifies with a reservation-how does this affect state Z which
has not yet ratified, or state A which has already ratified? If a
concrete example be preferred, reference may be made to the
various reservations made to Convention II of the Hague Peace
Conference of. 1907.
5
Considering first the case of the hypothetical state Z, there
seems to be little difficulty. The United States ratified Conven-
tion II with a reservation on November 27, 1909.5T France rati-
fied unconditionally on October 7, 1910. Since it is plain that
France might, if she had so chosen, have objected to the reser-
vation and so refused to deal with the United 'States as a party
to the treaty, it seems that by ratifying with notice and without
protest the reservation is embraced in the ratification.
Nicaragua declared her adhesion to this same convention on
December 16, 1909, with a reservation.8 Could an earlier signa-
note to the growing practice of acceding to general conventions with reser-
vations. He put the number of such accessions, as for April 1927, at
twenty-one. On February 18, 1927 the Swiss Federal Government in a
communication to the Secretary-General announcing the accession of Bo-
livia, with a reservation, to the Opium Convention of 1925, raised the ques-
tion: "It would, however, be of interest to us to be exactly informed as to
the practical consequences of the step taken by the Bolivian Government.
We do not in fact know any precedent for a State's acceding, subject to
ratification, to a general convention and we do not perfectly understand
the legal effect which should be attributed to an accession given in this
manner." In view of the twenty-one accessions subject to reservations
noted by the Secretary-General, there is interest in the following opinion
attributed to the State Department by the New York Times of October 10,
1928, on the occasion of Hungary's notification of her intention to adhere
to the Multilateral Pact for the Renunciation of War: "While comment
was withheld at the State Department, it was pointed out that no conditions
are possible in a document of adhesion; either a government adheres or it
does not."
56 SCOTT, THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907
(1915).
61 The reservation of the United States ran as follows: "The United
States approves this Convention with the understanding that recourse to
the Permanent Court for the settlement of differences referred in the said
Convention can be had only by agreement thereto through general or spe-
cific treaties of arbitration heretofore or hereafter concluded between the
parties in dispute."
58 Nicaragua's reservation ran as follows: "With regard to debts arising
from ordinary contracts between the citizen or subject of a nation and a
foreign government, recourse shall be had to arbitration only in the
specific case of a denial of justice by the courts of the country where the




tory, such as the United States or Great Britain, who ratified
unconditionally on November 27, 1909, have opposed this
adhesion? It seems that they might have done so had they so
chosen. The reservation does not, of course, increase the ex\ tent
of their obligations under the treaty, but it may well leave them
with a more limited field of rights against the later signatory
than they had anticipated at the moment of their ratifications.
They may argue, in fact, that the treaty with the addition of
the reservation is no longer the treaty which they ratified, and
this even though the addition may be unilateral in scope. On
these grounds it seems that Great Britain or the United States-
types of the hypothetical state A-might have been justified in
insisting that the objectionable proviso be deleted, or, failing
this, in refusing to recognize Nicaragua as a party to the
treaty. 9
From this one may proceed to inquire whether anything short
of an affirmative protest will be effective, and whether in the
absence of such a protest, consent will be implied from silence
and construed against the earlier signatory. The question thus
shifts once more from the substantive to the adjective ground.
The Havana Conference of 1928, in Article VI of the Convention
on Treaties,o uses language which appears to be inconclusive:
". .. In case the ratifying State makes reservations to the
treaty, it shall become effective when the other contracting
party informed of the reservations either expressly accepts
them, or having failed to reject them formally should per-
form actions implying its acceptance."
Practice shows that in very many cases signatories, once they
have deposited their own ratifications, are not accustomed to
take an actively affirmative or protesting part in the ratifica-
"Public loans secured by bond issues and constituting the national debt
shall in no case give rise to military aggression or the material occupation
of the soil of American nations."
59 This possibility is implicit in the report of Senor Gutierrez to the
Havana Conference. "Si 6stas (reservas) son aceptadas por los demts
contratantes, no hay ningfin inconveniente... Si las reservas en ]a
ratificaci6n no son aceptadas, la ratificaci6n se tiene por no hecha y el
Tratado no se perfecciona en cuanto a ese pas .... 1" 20 DI0Ao 285. It
is also endorsed by the Committee of E.xperts appointed by the League
of Nations in March 1926 to study the question of the admissibility of
reservations to general conventions." In order that any reservation what-
ever may validly be made in regard to a clause of the treaty, it is essential
that this reservation should be accepted by all the contracting parties, as
would have been the case if it had been put forward in the course of
negotiations. If not, the reservation, like the signature to which it is
attached, is null and void ... ." LEAGUE oF NATioNS DOCUMENTS (1927)
C. 357. M. 130. V.
rO See supra note 35.
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tions of others. On the whole, it seems to be the sense of the
Article VI that a passive attitude implies acceptance; the first
alternative does indeed speak of an "express" acceptance, but it
seems that in the absence of an open disavowal of the treaty,
almost anything might be construed as "actions implying its
acceptance." So, likewise, the report of the Committee of the
League of Nations, while emphatic upon the substantive fact of
consent, is silent as to the procedure by which this consent is
to be ascertained.61
It may have been a sense of the possible inconveniences of
this rule which led President Wilson in 1919 to express a con-
trary view in conversation with the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations.62 At this same interview, Senator Lodge
clearly believed- express consent to be unnecessary:
"I had supposed it had, been the general diplomatic prac-
tice with regard to reservations-which apply only to the
reserving Power and not to all the signatories, of course-
that with. regard to reservations it had been the general
practice that silence was regarded as acceptance and acqui-
escence...."
On the whole on may perhaps be justified in concluding that it
is the view of Senator Lodge which was endorsed by the Havana
Conference.
Some authorities have offered a middle way, suggesting that
there may be a difference in the degree of consent required to
make effective a reservation, properly so-called, and an interpre-
tative declaration.63 The distinction would proceed on the theory
that a reservation imported some alteration in the effect of the
text of a treaty, corresponding to the "textual amendment" con-
templated by Senator Lodge,64 whereas a declaration was not
intended to modify the operation of the treaty, but merely to
state explicitly the signatory's understanding of its terms.
There may have been some such thought in the mind of Secretary
Hughes, when he wrote the following letter to Senator Hale,
dated July 24, 1919:
61-See supra note 58.
62 For reference, see supra note 37. Senator Williams: "Mr. President,
suppose that for example we adopted a reservation . . . and that Germany
did nothing about it at all, and afterwards contended that so far as she
was concerned, it was new matter to which 'she was never a party; could
her position be justifiably disputed?" The President: "No."
6 The authority of Professor C. C. Hyde was claimed for this view at
the Paris meeting, 1924, qf the Aimerican Institute of International Law,
quotation being made from hit work. 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAWN (1922)
§ 519. .
6 See supra note 37.
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a". a. If a reservation as a part of the ratification makes
a material addition to or substantial change in the proposed
treaty, other parties will not be bound unless they assent...,
But where there is simply a statement of the interpretation
placed by the ratifying State upon ambiguous clauses in the
treaty, whether or not the statement is called a reservation,
the case is really not one of amendment, and acquiescence
of the other parties to the treaty may be readily inferred
unless express objection is made after notice has been re-
ceived of the ratification with the interpretative statement
forming a part of it...."
Examples of such declarations would presumably be the dec-
laration annexed by the United States to the Algeciras Conven-
tion of 1906,65 to the Brussels Anti-Slavery Agreement of 1890,cs
to the Radio-Telegraphic Convention of 1912,7 and to the Wash-
ington Treaty of 1922.r8
The suggested distinction was recently appealed to in the
debate in the Senate upon the Multilateral Treaty.co Senator
Robinson remarked that he considered the report from the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations to constitute something "in the
nature of a reservation, but not such a reservation as would
necessarily need to be submitted to the other signatories." It
seems here that confused nomenclature is obscuring principles
clear in themselves, for without the consent of the other sig-
natories, the declaration of one party can never amount to more
than a unilateral expression of opinion. This was stated rather
conservatively by Professor P. M. Brown in a letter to Senator
Bingham: "An interpretative resolution ... would have only
an attenuated legal significance unless expressly conveyed to
65 2 MALLOY, op. cit. supra note 21, at 2157. The resolution of the Senate
ran: 11. . without purpose to depart from the traditional American foreign
policy which forbids participation by the United States in the settlement of
political questions which are entirely European in their scope."
66 Ibid. 1964. "That the United States of America having neither pos-
sessions nor protectorates in Africa, hereby disclaims any intention, in
ratifying this treaty, to indicate any interest whatsoever in the possession
of protectorates established or claimed on that continent by the other
Powers, or any approval of the wisdom, expediency or lawfulness thereof,
and does not join in any expressions in the said General Act which might
be construed as such a declaration or acknowledgment."
67 3 ibid. 3048. "The delegation of the United States declares that its
government is under the necessity of abstaining from all action in regard
to rates, because the transmission of radiograms as well of ordinary
telegrams in the United States is carried on, wholly or in part by commer-
cial or private companies."
1s Ibid. 3094. "The United States understands that under the statement
in the preamble or under the terms of this treaty there is no commitment
to armed force, no alliance, no obligation to join in any defense." See
supra note 53.
6970 CONG. REc. 1713-1715 (1929), from which the following material,
including the correspondence, is taken.
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other signatories. . ." and, we may add, unless accepted by them
at least by implication.
In the course of this same debate, Senator Bingham read a
letter from Professor Borchard which crystallizes the distinction
between a "reservation" which is intended to modify the final
relationship, and which must therefore receive the consent "at
least by silent acquiescence" of all parties to that relationship,
and an "interpretative resolution" which may be unilateral but
can have no wider operation than to dispel, within the field of
morality, a possible future charge of bad faith. The letter runs:
".. . A reservation is the most formal method in which the
Senate could express an exception to or interpretation of
the treaty. It becomes in effect a counter-offer, must neces-
sarily be communicated to the foreign government before or
at the time of ratification, and usually, though not always,
requires express assent from the other party signatory... .
An interpretative resolution, on the other hand,
" . . would not, unless specifically so stated by the Senate,
necessarily be communicated to foreign governments by the
Secretary of State, and would, therefore, unless so com-
municated, be merely a unilateral expression by the Senate
of its understandings of the obligations the United States
was undertaking.
"In that event the resolution would have no legal effect.
I believe, as a limitation of the obligations of the United
States."
Great weight was given to this correspondence in the Senate.
The suggested argument that there can be a reservation made
independently of the consent of other signatories is scarcely
tenable. Once the necessity for such consent is conceded, it
seems that the distinction suggested above by Secretary Hughes
goes only to the formalities by which the existence of this con-
sent is to be proved. So that if the conclusion suggested earlier
be accepted, that silence will generally be construed as consent,
and, in fact, that there are no indispensable formalities, the
proposed distinction loses its formal importance. And, as a
matter of fact, the distinction was abandoned as a basis for
classification in the project submitted to the governing board of
the Pan-American Union by the American Institute of Inter-
national Law in 1925.0 Similarly, the question was raised
neither at the sessions held at Rio de Janeiro in 1927 of the
International Commission of Jurists, nor at the Pan-American
Conference at Havana, in 1928.




At this point it may be permissible to hazard the proposition
that, as things stand at present, reservations may be made by
both signatories of and parties acceding to a treaty up to and
including the time of ratification. Such reservations become
ineffective only upon a positive expression of dissent from an
earlier party to the treaty. Probably the most familiar example
of such a dissent is presented by the rejection by the conference
of states signatory of the protocol of signature of the statute
of the Permanent Court of International Justice of the Senate's
resolution of adherence to the World Court Protocol subject to
reservations. 1 Dissent to such reservations on the part of a
later signatory would in no way affect the validity of the reser-
vation, as that is already in existence through the consent of
earlier signatories. Such dissent might, however, operate to ex-
clude the later signatory from all part in the treaty. This is
the situation as it exists between the hypothetical states K and
Z,- and it seems to be paralleled in the actual position of Russia
as regards the Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of
War.7
3
At this point it becomes pertinent to inquire what is the posi-
tion of Russia with regard to the other signatories. She was
invited to accede to the pact by the French government, 4 and
signified, her willingness to do so on August 31, 1928, in a long
note 75 in which she not only criticized the "reservations" but
declared them not to be binding upon her in the following
language:
". ... The Soviet Government also cannot agree with any
other reservations which can serve as a justification for
war, particularly with reservations which are made in the
said correspondence in order to keep effective the compact
and resolutions entailed by affiliation with the League of
Nations and the Locarno Agreements ...
"Among the reservations made in the diplomatic corre-
spondence between the original participants of the compact,
especial attention of the Soviet Government is drawn by the
reservation of the British Government in paragraph 10 of
its note of lay 10th, this year. By virtue of this reserva-
tion the British Government reserves a freedom of action
towards a series of regions which it does not even enumer-
71 (1927) 21 Am. J. INT. LAW (Spec. Supp.) 1-11.
72' ee page 1100.
-The "reservations" of the original signatories have been criticized
also by Egypt, Persia and Turkey-see s-upra at 1089. It seems reasonable
to suppose that these reservations, so far as their legal effect goes, stand
or fall together. The position of Russia, therefore, may be argued as a
kind of test case.
74 The adhesion of other nations was invited by the United States. Theze
exceptional measures were taken in the case of Russia to get over the
difficulty that her government has not been recognized by the United States.
75 Shotwell, ap. cit. supra note 14, at 9L
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ate .. . However, inasmuch as the note of the British
Government has not been communicated to the Soviet Gov-
ernment as a part of the compact or its supplements,10 it
tfierefore cannot be considered obligatory for the Soviet
tovernment. Similarly, other reservations contained in the
diplomatic correspondence between the original participants
:may be passed- over." "
.The Russian state was not an original signatory of the pact.
She could not by any declaration of her own on August 31st
affect the relations existing between the fifteen original signa-
tories, as these could be collected from the note of the United
States to the signatory powers on June 23, 1928,78 embodying
the substance of Secretary Kellogg's speech before the American
Society of International Law, on April 28, 1928,19 and from the
notes in which the signatory powers express their concurrence in
this: interpretation. Her animadversions on the British reser-
vation relate to a closed matter.
The Russian position seems to have been stated by her on two
different grounds at different times. In the first place, there is
the language of the note of August 31, 1928, quoted above. Here
the Soviet government recognises the existence of reservations
by which the signatory. powers intend to limit the scope of their
obligation not to resort to war. This being conceded, Russia
then claims that such reservations cannot affect her as they were
not communicated to her as an integral part of the treaty. It
will be noticed that the point raised here is once more formal in
character. Once again it is necessary to inquire what form is
necessary to clothe the fact of consent with obligatory force.
There is no question as to the validity of the reservations per so:
70 The concluding paragraph of Secretary Kellogg's note of August 27,
1928, inviting general accessions to the treaty reads: "I shall shortly
transmit for your Excellency's convenient reference a printed pamphlet
containing the text in translation of M. Briand's original proposal to my
government of July 20th, 1927, and the complete record of the subsequent
diplomatic correspondence on the subject of a multilateral treaty for the
renunciation of war. . . ." THE GENERAL PACT FOR THE RENUNCIATION OF
WAR, supra note 10, at 56.
- The rule suggested in the last two sentences has also received par-
ticular support from Turkey, who states her adhesion not to imply adhesion
to "documents which have not been submitted as an integral part of the
pact to the collective signature of the participating States ... " Shotwell,
op. cit. supra note 14, at 4A.
78 THE GENERAL PACT FOR THE RENUNCIATION OF WAR, supra note 10, at
36. *
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In the hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations over the
pact on December 7, 1928, in reply to a question from Senator Swanson,
Secretary Kellogg stated that this speech might be taken to embrace the
offi'"ul interpretation of the pact.' U. S. Daily, Dec. 29, 1028.
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it is only their. binding force upon Russia that is denied. And
this for a lack of formality in her notification.
The suggestion has already been made that in the matter of
reservations all formalities are to be regarded solely as safe-
guards of the existence of the fact of consent. Russia admits
her factual knowledge of the reservations and adheres with such
knowledge. As this point is established, it seems that the for-
malities of her notification thereupon become unimportant.
Moreover, Russia's contention that the specific reservations in
question "cannot be considered obligatory" in no way affects the
weight of the reservations as among the original signatories.
Thus the effect of her protest seems to amount to this: she gives
the treaty a wider scope for herself, and, in the circumstances
contemplated in the reservation she reserves the right vot to go
to war. And yet it is surely plain that she does not intend to
bind herself without imposing any corresponding restriction on
the other signatories. This thought is stated in a press release
from M. Tchitcherin on August 5, 1928, before the French invi-
tation to accede had been received: Il
"... Notre gouvernement constate que le pacte, insuffisant
par soi-m~me, perd encore de sa valeur par les rdserves de
la France et de l'Angleterre, qui accordent a chaque partici-
pant le droit de l'interpreter dans l'esprit de sa proprepolitique nationaliste ou imp6rialiste .... ,, I'll
This may be said to be a foreshadowing of the more recent
argument - of some defenders of the treaty before the United
'o The invitation to accede was ex\tended to the Soviet Government on
August 27, 1928.
-1 The text is taken from LEYSEN, LE PACTS KELLOGG (1928) 76. A
suggestion has been made that the following consequence might be drawn
from the British Monroe Doctrine and the Russian statement: Britain
invades Afghanistan. This attack on Afghanistan is no breach of the
pact if the movemenb is in self-defence, provided one assumes that the
signatory powers accept the British reservation. Russia has not e.xpressly
accepted it, so it would be a breach as to Russia and Russia therefore is
free from her obligations to Britain under the pact. She could therefore
move troops into Afghanistan, and attack the British vithout becoming a
pact-breaker as to the United States; in the following war, neither Russia
nor Britain would be pact-breakers as to the United States since Russia
was freed by the British action, and the British action was protected by
her reservation. But we are reminded of Professor Shotwell's view that
the "real reservation to the pact" lies in the autonomy granted to each
signatory to formulate its own definition of "self-defence." Shotwell, op.
cit. supra, note 14, at 217. It may therefore be that the British action
would be covered by the general British reservation as to "self-defence"
to which Russia did not object.
s- Secretary Kellogg, speaking at the hearing on the pact before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: "As to the reservations . .. there
is absolutely nothing in the notes of the various governments which would
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States Senate that all these "reservations" are just interpreta-
tive declarations, 83 defining more narrowly that concept of "self-
defence" which is the reverse side of the provision outlawing
only those wars, easy to conceive of in debate, but seldom met
with in practice, which stand out nakedly as "wars of national
policy." 84
Thus, according to the second position assumed by Russia, she
disputes the interpretation placed upon the concept of self-
defence by the signatory powers, and here serves notice upon
them that should at any time a war break out in the cir-
cumstances contemplated in the reservations, to which a signa-
tory is a party, Russia will accuse such signatory of breaking
the pact.8 5 But it may be asked whether the effect of the corre-
spondence accompanying the pact was not to give to each signa-
tory by general agreement the right to define for itself the scope
to be allowed to the exception of self-defence. The objection
that such autonomy pushed to its conclusion robs the pact of
meaning 86 has been tacitly admitted by some of its sponsors in
the Senate, who have turned their weakness to strength by urg-
ing that in that case ratification can do no harm.
It seems to be upon this theory that the "interpretative re-
port" from the Committee on Foreign Relations was filed with
the Senate, 7 including the following "definitions of the Senate's
understanding of the pact":
change this treaty, if the treaty had been laid on the table and signed as
it is without discussion. It is true that during this discussion through
these notes with the various governments, many questions were raised as
to the meaning of the treaty." U. S. Daily, Dec. 29, 1928.
83 This point ofj view also finds expression in the article by Wright, op.
cit. supra note 1, at 94-107.
84 Senator Glass in a debate on the pact on the floor of the Senate: "The
treaty renounces what no nation on earth has ever proclaimed for a hundred
years. Not even Napoleon conceded that war was an instrument of his
national policy." 70 CONG. REC. 1781 (1929).
- The question may possibly be raised whether, under the conclusion
tentatively suggested supra at 1105, silence on the part of the powers does
not involve their acquiescence in the Russian view. The question is now
approached, however, from the angle of interpretation, and it seems difficult
to suppose that acquiescence could be presumed from mere silence to an
interpretation differing materially from the several powers' express defini-
tions in writing as set out in the correspondence.
86 This difficulty is emphasised by Borchard, op. cit. supra note 9, at 117.
"In view of the fact that the treaty apparently leaves such country con-
templating or exercising measures of force the judge of what is "self-
defence," who could assert that any signatory, going to war under
circumstances which it claims are 'self-defence,' is violating the Pact?
Has any modern nation ever gone to war (and without any suggestion of
bad faith) for any other motive? How then could this Pact ever be legally
violated?"
S7 There seems to have been divergence of opinion in certain quarters as
to the exact legal effect of the filing of the report. On one hand, a cable
1108
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"The Committee reports the above treaty with the under-
standing that the right of self-defence is in no way curtailed
or impaired by the terms or conditions of the treaty. Each
nation is free at all times and regardless of the treaty pro-
visions to defend itself and is the sole judge of what con-
stitutes the right of self-defence and the necessity and extent
of the same.
"The United States regards the Monroe Doctrine as a part
of its national security and defence. Under the right of self-
defence allowed by the treaty must necssarily be included
the right to maintain the Monroe Doctrine, which is a part
of our system of national defence....
"The Committee further understands that the treaty does
not provide sanctions, express or implied. Should any sig-
natory of the treaty or any nation adhering to the treaty
violate the terms of the same, there is no obligation or com-
mitment, express or implied, upon the part of any of the
other signers of the treaty to engage in punitive or coercive
measures as against the nation violating the treaty....
to The World, published in the issue of January 17, 1929, suggests that in
certain quarters of Great Britain the report is regarded as an outright
reservation. "The view is generally maintained that the American action
squares with the declaration of Sir Austen Chamberlain that Great Britain
may reserve the right to take action in certain regions of the world where
the maintenance of her interests is essential for national safety. No differ-
ence is seen between the British and American attitudes on the Pact." On
the other hand, a cable from Paris published in the same issue suggests
that the attitude of the Quai d'Orsay ("The ministry of Foreign Affairs,
however, let it be known that it considers the adoption as an unqualified
acceptance of the terms") corresponds more exactly to that of the State
Department. Secretary Kellogg stated in a Department press release that
the report is in no sense a reservation or limitation upon the treaty. It
seems that this latter attitude reflects the final intention of the Senate,
which required the filing of the report, but refrained from communicating
its provisions through official channels to other governments. The effect
of this action, in so far as this may be collected from the authorities cited
aupra in note 68 is to deprive the report of operative effect within the
strict field of international law. Senator Reed admitted this: "The only
way in which we could absolutely place a legal obligation in this treaty in
the sense that a contract is modified would be to attach a reservation, and
send that reservation to all of the nations that had signed the treaty or
may hereafter sign it." Senator Borah contended strenuously that the
significance of the report was to be moral only. "Then the proposal was
made that the report which was to have been made be taken up and adopted
by the Senate-acted upon by the Senate. I felt at once that that would
result in what would practically be a reservation, and even if it was not
technically so, the foreign governments would all regard it as a rezerva-
tion.... It was proposed later that the report be filed, that it be read
in the open Senate, and that an oral motion be made transmitting it to
the foreign governments.... I felt sure that taking the report and
drawing it away from the ordinary functions of a report and transmitting
a report of the Senate to foreign powers would have the same effect in
their minds precisely as a reservation would have.... I have never been
willing at any time to do anything that could be construed into a change
of the treaty or constitute a reservation ... " 70 CoNG. REC. 1717 (1929).
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"This treaty in no respect changes or qualifies our present
position or relation to any pact or treaty existing between
other nations or governments." 88
When the general acquiescence of the signatories in the note of
the United States dated June 23, 1928 is borne in mind, it seems
that Russia in her contention that the words of the treaty mean
something different from the interpretations there agreed upon
or formulated later in accordance with this note is playing the
part of Athanasius contra mundum. Private suspicions may be
entertained by some that Athanasius has the best of the moral
argument, but this cannot affect the question.
In other words, it seems that Russia may make her accusation
in the future, but Securus Judicat Orbis Terraru. The transi-
tion from accusation to conviction must be made before a tri-
bunal which is at least very unlikely, as things stand at present,
to consent to deprive itself of the evidence of the accompanying
correspondence, with which Russia was concededly familiar, to
ascertain the extent of the obligations contemplated by the
parties to the treaty.,
FURTHER PROPOSALS
The general agreement 90 among the signatories of the Iellogg
Pact to a liberal interpretation of the concept of self-defence does
not in any way preclude a general dissatisfaction with the pres-
ent rules as to the admissibility of reservations to multilateral
treaties. The question received the attention of the Eighth
Assembly of the League of Nations in the summer of 1927.
The question was opened in concrete form by the British
government in a note ' to the Council, dated March 17, 1926,
protesting against the reservations made by Austria upon her
signature of the open protocol to the Convention of the Opium
Conference of 1925, in which it was said:
". .. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government reser-
vations to a convention made, as in the present case, without
88 Ibid. 1783.
89 The importance of the correspondence in any judicial construction of
the treaty was emphasised in the hearings before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations on December 7, 1928: Senator Reed: "I would like to
know . . . whether we are to take into consideration in construing it,
certain statements that have been made during the progress of the nego-
tiations?"
Senator Robinson: "If ambiguities appear in the language of the contract,
I understand ypu may resort to the negotiations to determine the mean-
ing. .. .")
Senator Reed: "But in construing it and giving it its meaning, you think
that they should look into these previous communications?"
Secretary Kellogg: "Yes." U. S. Daily, Dec. 29, 1928.
90 Marred however by the dissent of Russia, Egypt, Persia and Turkey.
91 (1926). 7 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFmCIAL JOuRNAL 612.
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the knowledge or assent of the other signatories, involve an
important question of principle. .... " 52
A Committee of Experts was constituted the same month to con-
sider the question,93 and they reported to the Council of the
League in June 1927 as follows:
".... Ultimately the stage has been reached of leaving
certain treaties open unconditionally for varying periods
for signature by Powers that did not even participate in the
elaboration of the treaty. Such was the case of the Opium
Convention of February 19th, 1925.
"A signature appended in these circumstances constitutes
nothing more than 'accession': the Power signing in this
way simply associates itself with the Powers concluding the
treaty. It therefore accepts the latter under the same con-
ditions as the contracting parties. What they accepted, it
accepts. It cannot make any modification or addition for
such addition or modification would not be covered by the
reciprocal agreement which constitutes the treaty concluded
by the contracting Powers.
"It no doubt frequently happens that, in the course of
negotiation of a treaty, agreement is reached between the
contracting parties regarding a reservation which is put
forward by one of them and accepted by the others. In
such a case the former party may naturally, when append-
ing its signature to the act concluded, mention and main-
tain its reservation. The other contracting parties, wiea
they also append their signatures, signify thereby that they
have accepted the reservation and consent thereto.
"But when the treaty declares, as we have seen above,
that it permits the signature by Powers which have not
taken part in its negotiation, such signatures can only re-
late to what has been agreed upon between the contracting
Powers. In order that any reservation whatever may be
validly made in regard to a clause of the treaty, it is essen-
tial that this reservation should be accepted by all the con-
tracting parties, as would have been the case if it had been
put forward in the course of the negotiations. If not, the
reservation like the signature to which it is attached, is null
and void. .. ., 84
Two practical measures were suggested for dealing with the
problems of reservations made in practice by later adherents to
international conventions. In the first place, the Director of the
International Labor Office submitted a memorandum 05 to the
Council on June 15, 1927 in which he proposed the heroic meas-
ure of forbidding all reservations whatsoever to International
Labor Conventions. That there is nothing impossible in this
92 51 LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SERIES (1925) 338.
93 LEAGUE OF NATIONS DOCUMENTS (1927) Sth Assembly, A. 13, p. 6.
94 LEAGUE OF NATIONS DOCUMENTS (1927) c. 357, M. 130, V.
95 (1927) 8 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFICIAL JOURNAL 882.
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suggestion is indicated by the presence of such a prohibition in
Article 65 of the Declaration of London, 1908.21 But the memo-
randum is particularly interesting because it undertakes to con-
sider reservations both from that point of view which sees in
them an attempt to modify the text of the treaty, and from that
which sees in them simply a desire to "interpret" it:
"In theory, reservations would only be admissible if they
were accepted by all the bodies concerned in the adoption of
the convention, i.e., by the International Labour Conference.
This hypothesis itself, however, cannot be realized. If the
acceptance of the reservations is simply equivalent to an
interpretation of the convention, the Conference is not com-
petent to give it, since, under the treaties, the interpretation
of the Labour Conventions is expressly reserved for the Per-
manent Court of International Justice. If, on the other
hand, the acceptance of the reservations substantially modi-
fies the significance of the texts originally adopted, then it
constitutes a revision for which the Conference is competent;
but in that case the effect of the revision would be to create
a new convention, and it would in consequence annul all
previous ratifications, since the Conference's decisions are
not binding on the States Members of the International
Labour Organisation.
"Obviously, therefore, the legal arguments force us to
deny the admissibility of reservations on the occasion of the
ratification of international labour conventions. . ....
The particular legal considerations to which the memorandum
draws attention are not equally pressing in conventions other
than those of the International Labor Organisation, and in these
cases M. Zalewski had a suggestion to make. He recommended
the general adoption of the procedure followed in the Customs
Convention of 1923,11 where a protocol was attached containing
all the possible reservations which the signatories were prepared
to sanction in advance for later signatories. Other reservations
not to be found in the protocol were prohibited.18
A resolution 9 of the Council taken on June 27, 1927 adopted
the report of the Committee of Experts and took special notice
of the suggestion of M. Zalewski.
"The Council:
Takes note of the report and directs it to be circulated to
the members of the League;
96 Article 65 ran: "The provisions of the present Declaration must be
treated as a whole, and cannot be separated." But the United States signed
under reservation of art. 1, c. 5.
97Possibly suggested by the procedure of the International Copyright
Convention of 1910; Article 27 of this convention recognizes the right of
signatories, if. they prefer, to elect at time of ratification to be bound by
the anterior convention. 4 DE MARTENS, op. cit. supra note 41, at 590.
98 LEAGUE OF NATIONS DOCUMENTS (1927) C. 357. M. 130, V.
9 (1927) 8 LEAGuE OF NATIONS OFFcICAL JoURNAM 800.
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Requests the Secretary-General to be guided by the prin-
ciples of the Report regarding the necessity for acceptance
by all Contracting States when dealing in future with reser-
vations made after the close of a Conference at which a Con-
vention is concluded, subject, of course, to any special
decisions made by the Conference itself;
Calls the attention of Conferences on technical subjects
to the fact that, in cases where the text of a convention con-
tains, in the opinion of the signatories, certain articles to
which reservations can be made without prejudice to the
other articles, a method similar to that adopted by the Cus-
toms Conference may certainly be recommended.. .."
Article 39 of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Dis-
putes adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations at their
1928 session embodies the suggestion of Al. Zalewski.cO
What, then, is the position at the present time? There seems
to be little dispute that the reservation, like the treaty to which
it is attached, derives.its validity from the mutual consent of all
parties. Debate begins when the question is raised as to the evi-
dence from which such consent can be adduced. Thus it may be
illuminating to consider the question as one formal in nature,
lying more properly within the sphere of the acceptance of
treaties rather than of their interpretation.
In the case of reservations made before ratification by any
party, little difficulty is found. The ratifying state necessarily
consents to all reservations of which it has notice along with the
body of the treaty. But where ratification on the part of one or
more signatories has already taken place at the time the reserva-
tion is formulated, the consent of these signatories should be
sought afresh. The custom, however, which permits one to im-
ply the consent of such signatories from a mere failure on their
part to protest has probably established a rule, and it might re-
flect present practice more accurately if one were to say that the
reservations are effective in the absence of express dissent on
the part of any signatory. But however tacit the consent, con-
sent there must be. And hence it follows that there must be
communication also of the proposed reservations. It seems to
be here rather than in the thorny field of their content that a
distinction may be made between a "reservation," and an "inter-
pretative declaration" such as the report from the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations on the Multilateral Treaty for the
Renunciation of War. This distinction denies international
legal validity to the "interpretative declaration."
There would seem in principle to be no obstacle to the formu-
lation of any reservations by a state acceding to a completed
treaty, -rovided the consent of the other signatories was ob-




tained. The formal difficulty attending the proof of the double
question of communication of and consent to these reservations,
however, led to the recommendation of M. Zalewski, adopted by
the Council of the League of Nations,o1 that the only reserva-
tions permitted to acceding states should be those contemplated
by the orginal signatories at the time of ratification.
In the case of the reservations to the Multilateral Treaty
which have been most severely criticized, such as the British
reservation, since they were made by original signatories, the
condemnation in the report of the League of Nations Committee
has little force. A more cogent objection is the formal one raised
by Russia that in default of the incorporation of these various
"reservations" in the text of the treaty, their communication was
defective and their binding force upon acceding states corre-
spondingly impaired. But the point of view has already been
suggested that the essential fact is the actual knowledge, and
hence consent, of the acceding state; where this is known to ex-
ist, formal questions have lost their importance.
But if the Russian objection be treated as a reservation
against reservations, it seems to fall within the scope of the
condemnation of the report of the League of Nations Committee.
The original signatories seem to have agreed to treat it as a rhe-
torical ornament to Russia's adhesion; perhaps that is all it is.
But it serves to draw attention to a point upon which agreement
would be as desirable as it is at present absent. The solution
of actual and potential sources of dispute'may be at least as
useful as are abstract agreements to "outlaw war."
01 See supra notes 99 and 100. The question of reservations is included
in the general topic of "Treaties" which the League of Nations Committee
of Experts consider to be ripe for codification. In April 1927 this Com-
mittee adopted a proposal to refer the subject to a small Committee of
Experts for further study. LEAGUE OF NATIONS DOCUMENTS (1927) V.
Legal. V. 3; also (1928). 22 AM. J. INT. LAW (Spec. Supp.) 21-25.
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